Muslims in Hitler's War
The Nazis believed that Islamic forces would prove crucial wartime allies. But, as David Motadel shows, the Muslim world was unwilling to be swayed by the Third Reich's advances.
Tunis, December 19th, 1942. It was the day of Eid al-Adha, the Islamic feast of sacrifice. The retreat of Rommel's army had turned the city into a massive military camp. In the late afternoon, a German motorcade of four large cars drove at a slow, solemn pace along Tunis' main road, the Avenue de Paris, leaving the capital in the direction of the coastal town of Hamman Lif. The convoy contained Colonel General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, commander of the Wehrmacht in Tunisia, Rudolf Rahn, Hitler's consul in Tunis and the Reich's highest civil representative in North Africa, and some other high-ranking Germans. They were to visit the Bey of Tunis, Muhammad VII al-Munsif, who had remained the nominal ruler of Tunisia, to offer him their good wishes for the sacred holiday and to show their respect for Islam. In front of the Winter Palace of Hamman Lif, hundreds of cheering people saluted the convoy; the Tunisian guard extended them an honorary welcome. In the conversations with the monarch, the Germans promised that the next Eid al-Adha, or Eid al-Kabir as it is known in Tunisia, would take place in a time of peace and that the Wehrmacht was doing everything it could to keep the war away from the Muslim population. More important than the consultations, though, was the Germans' public show of respect for Islam. Back in his Tunis headquarters, Rahn enthusiastically cabled Berlin, urging it to make full propagandistic use of the 'solemn reception' at the 'Eid al-Kabir celebration'. In the following days, Nazi propaganda spread the news across North Africa, portraying the Third Reich as the protector of Islam.
At the height of the Second World War, in 1941-42, as Hitler's troops marched into Muslim-populated territories in North Africa, the Balkans, Crimea and the Caucasus and approached the Middle East and Central Asia, officials in Berlin began to see Islam as politically significant. In the following years, they made significant attempts to promote an alliance with the 'Muslim world' against their alleged common enemies: the British Empire, the Soviet Union, America and Jews.
At the height of the Second World War, in 1941-42, as Hitler's troops marched into Muslim-populated territories in North Africa, the Balkans, Crimea and the Caucasus and approached the Middle East and Central Asia, officials in Berlin began to see Islam as politically significant. In the following years, they made significant attempts to promote an alliance with the 'Muslim world' against their alleged common enemies: the British Empire, the Soviet Union, America and Jews.
Yet the reason for the Third Reich's engagement with Islam was not only that Muslim-populated regions had become part of the warzones but also, more importantly, because at the same time, Germany's military situation had deteriorated. In the Soviet Union, Hitler's Blitzkrieg strategy had failed. As the Wehrmacht came under pressure, Berlin began to seek broader war coalitions, thereby demonstrating remarkable pragmatism. The courtship of Muslims was to pacify the occupied Muslim-populated territories and to mobilise the faithful to fight on the side of Hitler's armies.
German officials had increasingly engaged with Islam since the late 19th century, when the kaiser ruled over substantial Muslim populations in his colonies of Togo, Cameroon and German East Africa. Here, the Germans sought to employ religion as a tool of control. Sharia courts were recognised, Islamic endowments left untouched, madrasas kept open and religious holidays acknowledged. Colonial officials ruled through Islamic intermediaries who, in return, gave the colonial state legitimacy. In Berlin, Islam was moreover considered to offer an opportunity for exploitation in the context of Wilhelmine Weltpolitik. This became most obvious during the Middle Eastern tour of Wilhelm II in 1898 and in his dramatic speech, given after visiting the tomb of Saladin in Damascus, in which he declared himself a 'friend' of the world's '300 million Mohammedans' and, ultimately, in Berlin's efforts to mobilise Muslims living in the British, French and Russian empires during the First World War. Although all attempts to spread jihad in 1914 had failed, German strategists maintained a strong interest in the geopolitics of Islam.
German officials tended to view Muslim populations under the rubric of 'Islam'. An advantage of using Islam rather than ethno-national categories was that Berlin could avoid the thorny issue of national independence. Moreover, religion seemed to be a useful policy and propaganda tool to address ethnically, linguistically and socially heterogeneous populations. The Germans saw Islam as a source of authority that could legitimise involvement in a conflict and even justify violence. In terms of racial barriers, the regime showed remarkable pragmatism: (Non-Jewish) Turks, Iranians and Arabs had already been explicitly exempted from any official racial discrimination in the 1930s, following diplomatic interventions from the governments in Tehran, Ankara and Cairo. During the war the Germans showed similar pragmatism when encountering Muslims from the Balkans and the Turkic minorities of the Soviet Union. Muslims, it was clear to every German officer from the Sahara to the Caucasus, were to be treated as allies.
On the ground in North Africa, in contact with the coastal populations, army officials tried to avoid frictions. As early as 1941, the Wehrmacht distributed the handbook Der Islam to train the troops in correct behaviour towards Muslims. In the Libyan and Egyptian desert, German authorities courted religious dignitaries, most importantly the shaykhs of the influential Sufi orders. The problem was that the most powerful religious force in the Cyrenaican warzone, the Islamic Sanusi order, was the spearhead of the anti-colonial resistance against Italian rule and fought alongside Montgomery's army against the Axis. In any case, Berlin's promises to liberate the Muslims and protect Islam stood in sharp contrast to the violence and destruction that the war had brought to North Africa and the Germans ultimately failed to incite a major Muslim pro-Axis movement in the region.
On the Eastern Front the situation was very different. The Muslims of Crimea and the North Caucasus had confronted the central state ever since the tsarist annexation in the 18th and 19th centuries and the Bolshevist takeover had worsened the situation. Under Stalin, the Muslim areas suffered unprecedented political and religious persecution. Islamic literature was censored, sharia law banned and the property of the Islamic communities expropriated. Party cadres took over mosques, painted Soviet slogans on their walls, hoisted red flags on their minarets and chased pigs through their sacred halls. Still, Islam continued to play a crucial role in shaping social and political life. After the invasion of the Caucasus and Crimea, German military authorities, eager to find local collaborators to stabilise the volatile rear areas, did not miss the opportunity to present themselves as the liberators of Islam. General Ewald von Kleist, commander of Army Group A, which occupied the Caucasus, urged his officers to respect the Muslims and to be aware of the pan-Islamic implications of the Wehrmacht's actions: 'Among all of the German Army Groups, Army Group A has advanced the furthest. We stand at the gates to the Islamic world. What we do, and how we behave here will radiate deep into Iraq, to India, as far as to the borders of China. We must constantly be aware of the long-range effect of our actions and inactions.' Similar orders were issued by General Erich von Manstein in Crimea. In his infamous order of November 20th, 1941, which demanded that 'the Jewish-Bolshevist system be exterminated once and for all' and which became one of the key documents used by his prosecution at Nuremberg after the war, Manstein urged his troops to treat the Muslim population well: 'Respect for religious customs of the Mohammedan Tartars must be demanded.'
In their attempt to control the strategically sensitive rear areas, the Germans made extensive use of religious policies. They ordered the rebuilding of mosques, prayer halls and madrasas and the re-establishment of religious holidays. In the Caucasus, they staged massive celebrations at the end of Ramadan in 1942, of which the most notable was in the Karachai city of Kislovodsk. Under Soviet rule, the Muslims of Kislovodsk had not openly observed Eid al-Fitr and the celebration became a key marker of difference between Soviet and German rule. Attended by a large delegation of high-ranking Wehrmacht generals, it included prayers, speeches and exchanges of gifts; the Germans had brought captured weapons and Qurans. In the centre of Kislovodsk, a parade of Karachai horsemen was organised. Behind the honorary tribune for Muslim leaders and Wehrmacht officers, an oversized, open papier-mâché Quran was arranged, displaying two pious quotations in Arabic script. On the right-hand page there was the shahada, the statement of faith: 'There is no god but Allah/Muhammad is his Prophet' (La ilaha illa Allah/Muhammadan rasul Allah). On the left was the popular Quranic verse (61:13): 'Help [comes] from Allah/and a nigh victory' (Nasr min Allah/Wa fath qarib). Nailed above the Quran was an enormous wooden Reich eagle with a swastika. In Crimea the Germans even established an Islamic administration, the so-called 'Muslim Committees'. In the end, the hopes for freedom among the Muslims of the Soviet borderlands were shattered. The attitudes of Nazi officials towards the Muslim population cooled the longer the occupation period lasted. Ordinary German soldiers, influenced by propaganda defaming the Asiatic peoples of the Soviet Union as sub-humans, were not prepared for dealing with Muslims. Even worse, after the German retreat, Stalin accused the Muslim minorities of collective collaboration with the enemy and ordered their deportation.
"The attitudes of Nazi officials towards the Muslim population cooled the longer the occupation period lasted".
Balkans was different again. When the Germans invaded and dissolved Yugoslavia in 1941, they initially did not get involved in the Muslim-populated regions, most importantly Bosnia and Herzegovina, which came under the control of the newly founded Croatian Ustaša state. The Ustaša regime, led by Hitler's puppet dictator Ante Pavelić, officially tried to court its Muslim subjects, while murdering Jews and Roma and persecuting Orthodox Serbs. From early 1942, however, the region became increasingly engulfed in a severe conflict between the Croatian regime, Tito's Communist partisans and Dragoljub 'Draža' Mihailović's Orthodox Serbian Četniks, who were fighting for a greater Serbia. The Muslim population was repeatedly attacked by all three parties. Ustaša authorities employed Muslim army units to fight both Tito's partisans and Četnik militias. Soon, Muslim villages became the object of retaliatory attacks. The number of Muslim victims grew to the tens of thousands. Ustaša authorities did little to prevent these massacres. Leading Muslim representatives turned to the Germans for help, asking for Muslim autonomy under Hitler's protection. In a memorandum of November 1st, 1942 they professed their 'love and loyalty' for the Führer and offered to fight with the Axis against 'Judaism, Freemasonry, Bolshevism, and the English exploiters'. Officials in Berlin were thrilled.As the civil war in the Balkans spun out of control, the Germans became more and more involved in the Muslim-populated areas. In their attempts to pacify the region, the Wehrmacht and, more importantly, the SS saw the Muslims as welcome allies and promoted Nazi Germany as a protector of Islam in South-eastern Europe. The campaign began in Spring 1943, when the SS sent the Mufti of Jerusalem on a tour to Zagreb, Banja Luka and Sarajevo, where he met religious leaders and gave pro-Axis speeches. When visiting the grand Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque in Sarajevo, he gave such an emotional speech about Muslim suffering that parts of the audience burst into tears. In the following months the Germans launched a massive campaign of religiously charged propaganda. At the same time, they began to engage more closely with Islamic dignitaries and institutions, as they believed that religious leaders wielded most influence on the people. Muslims were formally under the authority of the highest religious council, the Ulema-Medžlis, and Nazi officials repeatedly consulted with its members and tried to co-opt them. Many Islamic leaders hoped that the Germans would help them found a Muslim state. Soon, however, it became clear that the Wehrmacht and the SS were not able to pacify the region; at the same time, the German support for the Muslim population fuelled partisan and Četnik hatred against them. Violence escalated. In the end, a quarter of a million Muslims died in the conflict.
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